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THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE VIRGINIA MILITARY
INSTITUTE: AN ESSAY ON THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
ALLAN IDES*

The Virginia Military Institute (VMI), an all-male military college located
in Lexington, Virginia, is one of fifteen institutions of higher education
directly supported by the Commonwealth of Virginia. In March of 1991,
the Department of Justice filed a civil rights enforcement action against the
Commonwealth, claiming that VMI's all-male admissions policy violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After a trial
on the merits, the district court ruled in favor of the Commonwealth,
finding that the discriminatory admissions policy was substantially related
to an important government interest-namely, the promotion of diversity
in higher education.' The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed and remanded the case with instructions to implement an
2
appropriate remedy.
Given the state of current constitutional doctrine, the decision of the
court of appeals was far from surprising. Yet, despite the predictable nature
of the outcome and regardless of one's views on the admission of women
to VMI, the VMI case does raise interesting and important issues regarding
the scope of judicial review in the enforcement of judicially created constitutional rights. In what follows, I will first discuss the application of doctrine
developed through precedent as that doctrine applies to the VMI admissions
policy; in the second section, I offer an alternative approach to the adjudication of gender discrimination cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment. That alternative is, of course, placed in the context of the VMI
litigation. My primary point in presenting this alternative, however, has less
to do with the jurisprudence of gender discrimination than it does with an
exploration of the judicial role in the adjudication of judicially created
constitutional rights.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS

DocTRINE:

APPLYING THE ESTABLISHED

FORMULA

The intermediate scrutiny test' is the judicially created method for
assessing claims of gender discrimination arising under the Equal Protection

* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. I am indebted to
my students in Constitutional Law, Fall '91 and Fall '92, for their many insights into the
issues discussed in the text. Also my thanks to Denis Brion whose critical comments on an
earlier draft improved the overall project tremendously, and to Lash LaRue for sharing his
intriguing perspectives on judicial review.
1. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated and
remanded, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
2. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 900 (4th Cir. 1992).
3. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 69 (1981) (discussing heightened scrutiny for
gender-based classifications); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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Clause. 4 Regardless of which linguistic formula one adopts, the essence of
intermediate scrutiny, as applied in the context of gender discrimination,
boils down to a simple proposition: the government is usually forbidden
from discriminating on the basis of gender, but in rare cases may do so if
the government asserts a sufficiently important reason for the discrimination
and devises a statute or program that is carefully designed to advance the
asserted interest. The latter qualification is sometimes phrased in terms of
demonstrating a substantial relationship between the gender classification
5
and the interest to be advanced.
Obviously, this test gives the judiciary a certain degree of latitude in
determining the legitimacy of any particular gender discrimination. There is
no mathematical formula for measuring importance or for calculating the
degree to which a statute must be appropriately tailored. However, the
concept of substantial relationship is not completely elastic. To survive
intermediate scrutiny, a law favoring one gender over the other must, at a
minimum, be based upon a real distinction between the sexes. Moreover,
that distinction must be directly related to the governmental interest to be
advanced by the discrimination, and that interest must be deemed sufficiently
important to overcome what has become a strong presumption against
gender classifications. Perhaps most importantly, the means-ends analysis
of intermediate scrutiny narrowly focuses the attention of the court on a
finite set of factors, the consequence of which is to limit the court to a
somewhat microscopic view of what may be a macroscopic problem.
The district court applied the intermediate scrutiny test and concluded
that the VMI admissions policy presented that rare case of permissible
gender discrimination. The court's conclusion was premised on a series of
interrelated findings, none of which were challenged by the Department of
Justice at trial: 1) the promotion of diversity in higher education is an
important state goal; 2) single-sex schools, such as VMI, are educationally
sound and contribute to diversity; 3) VMI's adversative system6 of education
also contributes to diversity; and, 4) transforming VMI to a coeducational
institution would undermine the goal of diversity by eliminating the school's
single-sex status and by drastically altering the school's unique adversative
system of education. Based on the foregoing, the district court concluded
that VMI's single-sex status was substantially related to the advancement
of diversity in higher education.
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Another way of viewing intermediate scrutiny is as a mid-point between rational
basis analysis, which gives almost complete deference to legislatively created classifications,
and strict scrutiny analysis, which strongly presumes the unconstitutionality of certain suspect
classifications. In actual application, however, the intermediate scrutiny "mid-point" falls
much closer to the strict scrutiny side of the analytical spectrum.
6. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated
and remanded, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that "[tlhe VMI method conforms
generally to an adversative, or doubting, model of education. Physical rigor, mental stress,
absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values are the salient attributes of the VMI educational experience").
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In arriving at this conclusion, the district court distinguished the leading
precedent, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,7 a case in which
the Supreme Court upheld the claimed right of a man to enroll in a degree
program at an otherwise all-female nursing school. In that case, the Court
found that there was nothing about the educational mission of the nursing
school that would be undermined by permitting a man to matriculate into
the program. Among other things, men were already permitted to attend
and participate in classes, and there was no showing that the presence of
men undermined the educational experience of the women nursing students.
The Court also rejected, as implausible, the state's asserted interest in
promoting affirmative action for women.
The district court distinguished Hogan in two ways. First, relying on a
series of detailed findings, the district court concluded that the presence of
women in the VMI cadet corps would significantly alter the school's unique
adversative system of education. 8 Second, the district court found that the
claimed interest in diversity was both plausible and legitimate. 9 Moreover,
that diversity interest would be directly undermined if the adversative system
were altered significantly. In short, unlike the situation in Hogan, gender
discrimination by VMI was directly relevant to advancing a plausible and
legitimate (and given the result, presumably "important") state interest.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying
the same intermediate scrutiny test within the context of the same findings,
came to a very different conclusion. Although the Fourth Circuit recognized
both the legitimacy of single-sex education and the value of VMI's unique
adversative system of education, the appellate court nonetheless concluded
that VMI's single-sex admissions policy could not survive intermediate
scrutiny in the absence of some substantial reason for conferring this benefit
upon men and not upon women. 10 One is tempted to conclude that the
difference between the decision of the court of appeals and that of the
district court is the result of a perceived malleability of the intermediate
scrutiny test. Such a conclusion, however, misses a very important distinction
between the two opinions, a distinction that underscores the relatively rigid
nature of ends-means analysis, a rigidity that is more pronounced when the
ends-means analysis is applied in the context of an elevated level of scrutiny.
In upholding the authority of VMI to discriminate, the district court's
reasoning operated at a level of generality that actually avoided an application of the substantial relationship test. That reasoning went something
like this: single-sex schools make a valuable contribution to educational
diversity; VMI is a single-sex school; therefore VMI directly contributes to
educational diversity. Of course, it follows that admission of women to
VMI would undermine educational diversity. The district court followed a

7. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
8. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1413.
9. Id.

10. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992).
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similar line of reasoning with respect to VMI's unique, adversative system
of education: the adversative system of education makes a valuable contribution to educational diversity; the adversative system can only function in
a single-sex setting; VMI offers an adversative system of education in a
single-sex setting; therefore VMI's method of education, which is necessarily
single-sex, directly contributes to educational diversity. Again it follows that
admission of women to VMI would undermine educational diversity.
At the above level of generality, and assuming one accepts the unchallenged findings, the logic of the district court's opinion appears quite
reasonable. Moreover, the placement of that logic within the context of
intermediate scrutiny ostensibly leads to the district court's conclusion that
the test has been satisfied: an important government interest, diversity in
higher education, is directly advanced by VMI's single-sex admissions policy-by the gender challenged discrimination. The problem with the district
court's reasoning is not a failing in logic; rather the problem lies the lower
court's implicit assumption that the substantial relationship test operates as
a method for assessing generalized policy concerns-the legitimacy of singlesex schools. The opposite is true. The substantial relationship test requires
a fact-specific inquiry into the precise issue presented, and the issue presented
by VMI's admissions policy is not the legitimacy of a single-sex admissions
policy. The issue is the legitimacy of an all-male admissions policy. This
distinction is more than a clever play on words; it requires the analysis to
shift from a somewhat abstract examination of single-sex education, to a
more precise examination of the facts presented in this case, namely, a
system of higher education that provides a unique educational opportunity
to men. This shift in attention also forces one to apply the concept of
substantial relationship-to search for the sex difference that permits the
state to favor men in this context.
Applying the substantial relationship test, the question is not if a state
can provide single-sex education for its citizens generally, but, under the
given facts, if a state can provide such education for only its male citizens.
In order to answer this question affirmatively one must show that there is
some legitimate difference between men and women that permits the state
to grant men, and not women, this special opportunity. With respect to
single-sex education, nothing in the district court opinion suggests any basis
for favoring men in this regard. In fact, the opinion explicitly states that
both men and women benefit from single-sex education. Similarly, although
the adversative system of education apparently functions best in a singlesex setting; it does not necessarily require an all-male setting. Thus, although
the district court's opinion adequately justifies the single-sex status of VMI,
it does not adequately justify the all-male status; it does not demonstrate
the necessary substantial relationship between the gender discrimination and
the asserted state interest of diversity in education.
From a practical perspective, the lesson is simple. In a case of gender
discrimination, a court must apply the substantial relationship test to the
actual discrimination practiced by the state actor. The attempted justification
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must focus upon a genuine difference between the sexes that relates to the
advancement of an asserted government interest. If a law favors one gender
over the other, the justification for that favored status must bear upon a
relevant distinction between the two genders, and relevance must be established in the context of the government interest being advanced. Rostker v.
Goldberg" presents a perfect example. In Rostker, the Court found no
violation of the equal protection principle when only men were required to
register for the draft.' 2 The underlying premise of the Court's opinion was
that only men were eligible for combat and that the draft was designed for
combat readiness. That being the case there was a necessary and substantial
relationship between the government's interest-combat readiness-and the
status of being a male.
In the context of the VMI case, there was no necessary relationship
between educational diversity and the status of being a male. The district
court's more abstract examination of the legitimacy of single-gender schools
did not address this critical point, and to that extent the district court's
resolution of the case appears to be flawed. But before condemning the
district court's opinion, one ought to dig a little deeper into the constitutional
milieu surrounding this litigation. The district court's intuitive effort to
import some flexibility into the substantial relationship test appears more
defensible if the litigation is examined from the context of constitutional
judgment rather than constitutional doctrine.
CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGMENT: JUDIcIAL GUARDIANS AND JUDIcIAL CREATORS

The Constitution lays the foundation for the structure of our government
and sets limitations upon the exercise of governmental power. Any significant deviation from that structure or transgression of those limits is unconstitutional and void. In essence, the Constitution sets the general rules of
the game by proclaiming a fundamental and binding body of principles.
The judiciary, under the legacy of Marbury v. Madison'3 , enforces that
fundamental law through the power of judicial review. The judicial function,
under Marbury, is that of a guardian. Seen as such, the Constitution and
the exercise of judicial review operate as a somewhat conservative, stabilizing
check upon the preferences and innovations of an evolving society.
This does not mean, however, that the Constitution has or must remain
static in the absence of amendment. Much of the language of the Constitution is stated in generalities, and the ideas animating that language bespeak
fluidity and invite accommodation. All branches and levels of government
interpret and give meaning to that language and those ideas. Interpretation
necessarily means change. Indeed, once one accepts the legitimacy or simply
the practical reality of the power of judicial review, it follows that what
we perceive as constitutioial law will evolve through the common-law
process of interpretation and application. But given the underlying premise
11. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
12. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981).
13. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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of a constitution as the embodiment of fundamental, enforceable principles,
the guardian function of judicial review is not to rewrite the Constitution,
but at most to mediate between the text and the political resolution of
contemporary problems.
Examples of this process of mediation abound: the development of the
4
Commerce Clause over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries;1
the evolution of principles involving the separation of powers;15 and the
shift from rules of territoriality to principles of reasonableness in the context
of personal jurisdiction. 16 There is, of course, an inherent danger in this
process. At some point the accommodation may break the fundamental
boundaries of constitutional structure. The relative desuetude of federalism
is a case in point. An overly accommodating judiciary ceases to function
as a proper guardian. Viewed from the opposite perspective, an overly rigid
judiciary may abuse the guardian function by preventing the natural evolution and continuing vitality of our political system. But overall, the process
appears both necessary-a static Constitution would collapse-and basically
sound-modern political problems ought to examined against the backdrop
of experience premised upon fundamental, but somewhat flexible principles.
This guardian function does not, however, adequately describe the full
breadth of judicial power.
As discussed in the previous section, the Equal Protection Clause, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, prohibits states from engaging in invidious discrimination based on gender. Placing this principle within the
reasoning of the foregoing discussion, one might suppose that in enforcing
the gender discrimination component of the Equal Protection Clause, the
judiciary simply acts as a constitutional guardian, exercising its normal
checking function upon an exercise of governmental power. Specifically, in
the context of VMI's all-male admissions policy, the Commonwealth of
Virginia has exceeded the fundamental principles of law that serve as a
foundation for all government action, and, as a consequence, the all-male
admissions policy must fall. But such a supposition overlooks a potential
distinction between the source of this particular exercise of judicial review
and those exercises in which the judiciary actually does function as a
guardian.
When VMI was founded in 1839 as an all-male military institute, the
Constitution provided no grounds for challenging the school's all-male
status. Nor did the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 alter
1
the basic constitutional landscape with respect to gender discrimination. 7
The idea that the Equal Protection Clause, or any other substantive provision
of the Fourteenth Amendment, provided special protection against gender

14. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).

15. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
16. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
17. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wail.) 130 (1872) (upholding state refusal to
grant law license to woman).
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discrimination did not take hold until the Supreme Court's 1971 decision
in Reed v. Reed.18 In that case, the Court took the first step toward
incorporating gender discrimination into the Constutition and establishing
the intermediate scrutiny test as the appropriate method for assessing statebased gender discriminations. 9 Neither that step nor the subsequent steps
leading up to the Court's decision in Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan were premised upon a newly discovered insight into the original
intent of the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment. No one seriously argues
that the purpose or even one of the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to prevent gender discrimination. Rather the incorporation of gender
discrimination doctrine into the Equal Protection Clause was a judicially
created extrapolation from the law that had been developed in the context
of race discrimination. Most importantly, this judicial reworking of the
Equal Protection Clause took place during a time when social perceptions
about proper gender roles were changing rapidly and radically. The intermediate scrutiny test operates, in effect, to conform governmental practices
to those developing mores. Seen as such, the jurisprudence of gender
discrimination is not a product of the guardian function, i.e., the preservation of previously established fundamental law, but the product of what
one may call a creative function, i.e., the creation of new fundamental law.
One could argue that the jurisprudence of gender discrimination did
not involve an exercise of the creative function, but was a result of an
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and, therefore, more akin to
the guardian function. After all, the difference between guardian interpretation and creation will more often than not be a question of degree, not
quality. Such an argument would be difficult to sustain. The Fourteenth
Amendment was not designed to prevent gender discrimination; and even
if the amendment can be construed to provide some judicial oversight of
laws that discriminate regardless of the nature of the classification, nothing
in the history of the amendment suggests any special status for discrimination
based on gender. The inclusion of gender discrimination into the equal
protection guarantee and the elevated scrutiny applied to such discriminations were the result of the Court's incorporation into the Constitution of
its own perceptions of appropriate contemporary values. Instead of adjusting
the Constitution to permit the political resolution of contemporary problems
by mediating as an exercise of its guardian function, the Court forced the
preferences and innovations of an evolving society into the Constitution,
creating a new constitutional text that conformed to emerging ideas about
the proper roles of men and women. In essence, the judiciary forced the
adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment. 2°
I do not mean to suggest that such exercises of constitutional creativity
are inherently "illegitimate." They are, however, different from guardianship in the pure sense, and, perhaps, at least somewhat troubling. Of course,
18. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
19. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971).
20. There is one possible distinction. The gender discrimination test under the Equal

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:35

at some point on the spectrum between pure guardianship and pure creation,
there is a realm in which the distinction between the two functions blurs.
This is as it ought to be. The continuing vitality of the Constitution depends
upon interpretive exercises of the guardian function that permit the political
resolution of contemporary problems; such interpretive exercises will, from
time to time and depending on one's interpretive perspective, verge on the
creative function. Similarly, the Court may successfully exercise an independent creative authority only because the legitimacy to do so depends
ultimately on some relationship between that authority and the concept of
guardianship. In short, there is no all-purpose or self-evident demarcation
between the two functions in this mid-range, and, more generally, if the
legitimacy of an exercise of either function is to be measured at all, that
measurement will turn more on judgment and experience than on any more
specific criterion. Still the functions are, at least at the furthest extremes,
quite different.
The guardian function traces its legitimacy to Marbury and can be
rationally defended as a component of a system of government premised
upon a body of fundamental principles. If those principles are to retain the
force of law, there must be some mechanism of enforcement. The judiciary
provides that mechanism in our system. And even though the guardian
function inevitably leads to a gradual evolution of fundamental principles,
the function remains essentially conservative and quite consistent with the
idea of the Constitution as the embodiment of first principles.
The authority to create new constitutional principles, however, traces
its lineage to Marbury in a more circuitous fashion. Certainly, nothing in
our constitutional system designates the judiciary as the equivalent of
modern-day constitutional drafters with an uninhibited power to amend the
basic text. 2' Nor does the vitality of our constitutional system depend upon
any such designation. The judicial power to create constitutional law beyond
the confines of interpretation and accommodation derives from or is inherent
in the process of constitutional guardianship. If the guardian function
requires the interpretation and application of constitutional text, it follows
inevitably that each act of guardianship is an independent act of creation.
There does arrive a point when the relationship between guardianship and
creation becomes attenuated or even nonexistent. That variable point defines
the act of pure creation. However, the distinction between exercises of this
pure creative function and the more clearly legitimate interpretive guardianship is more a question of judgment than of mathematical certainty. The
point is that the creative function finds its source as a byproduct of the
guardian function.
A brief discussion of Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 1)22 may
add clarity to the foregoing. Certainly one could argue, as some have, that
Protection Clause uses intermediate scrutiny. However, if the Court had permitted the Equal
Rights Amendment to pass, strict scrutiny would likely have been the standard. See infra note
26.
21. Cf. U.S. CoNsr. art. V (providing for amendment of constitution by states).
22. 347 U.S. 403 (1954).
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the Brown decision extended the reach of judicial power beyond its normally
accepted bounds, that the judicial rejection of the separate but equal doctrine
fell well outside the guardian function. But I believe such an argument
misreads the import of the Brown decision. Regardless of what one ultimately concludes about the precise purpose of the substantive provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment-privileges or immunities, due process, equal
protection-there is no doubt that the amendment was designed to address
problems of racial discrimination in some fashion. Had the Court not
obliterated the relevance of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the
Slaughterhouse Cases,23 that clause would seem to have provided a most
appropriate vehicle for examining challenges to Jim Crow in all its various
guises. And whether the precise formula proclaiming separate as unequal
was part of the original drafter's thinking is less important than the fact
that the judiciary was granted some warrant to interpret and apply this
clause in the context of racial discrimination. By rejecting the separate but
equal doctrine, the Court was not creating a new constitutional right; it
was placing an established right within the context of a 1950s America in
which education played such a significant role. This mediating interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment may have contained some elements of the
creative impulse, but on the spectrum between guardianship and creation,
Brown fails well within the arguable realm of the former. The practice of
racial segregation created a major impediment to the full enjoyment of civil
rights and opportunities; it abridged the privileges and immunities of those
precise United States citizens the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
protect. Thus, although Brown clearly ran counter to then current social
practices, it was those practices and not the Court that were out-of-touch
with fundamental constitutional principles. The same simply cannot be said
for the jurisprudence of gender discrimination. 24 I do not mean to suggest
that gender discrimination is a good thing; indeed, I personally believe
gender discrimination to be both unwise and unjust. My only point here is
to fully appreciate the Court's role in the creation of this new right.
To place this discussion in a slightly different but perhaps more politically acceptable framework, assume that in a properly presented case the
Supreme Court, after examining the most current theories of economics,
concludes that the Constitution requires all levels of government to operate
on a balanced budget. Such a conclusion would hardly qualify as an exercise
of the guardian function; indeed, this reworking of the Constitution would
be nothing more that the forced adoption of some version of the Balanced
Budget Amendment. The Court may have the raw, creative power to issue
such a judgment; but such an exercise of power is far removed from the

23. 16 Wall. 36 (1873).
24. The decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), unlike the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, does fall into the law creation category. Yet, even Roe has a more

tenable foundation than the jurisprudence of gender discrimination. Roe was not, after all,
decided at a time when a relevant constitutional amendment was being actively considered and
rejected. Cf. infra note 26.
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legitimate scope of judicial review as perceived from a guardian perspective. 2z
One can state with some confidence that few if any observers of the Court
would find the judicial creation of a balanced budget principle a comfortable
exercise of the judicial function.
However, the doctrine of gender discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause has been established and has become part of our constitutional
perception of justice. Certainly lower federal courts are not free to ignore
developed doctrine. Thus, in applying the intermediate scrutiny test to VMI's
all-male admissions policy, the court of appeals did in fact exercise the
guardian function; it enforced judicially created constitutional doctrine
against contrary state practices in a manner consistent with Supreme Court
precedent. Nonetheless one cannot deny that this exercise of the guardian
function rested on a base of relatively pure judicial creativity. The district
court's reluctance to apply intermediate scrutiny with the full force of that
test's language and logic may have been the result of the dissonance triggered
by the tension between the judicially created doctrine of gender discrimination and the lower court's perceptions of the proper role of the judicial
branch. After all, but for the creative, and somewhat nonjudicial impulses
of the Supreme Court during the 1970s, VMI's all-male admissions policy
would be plainly constitutional. 26 In this manner, the district court's resolution of the controversy reflected the normal, acceptable, indeed, constitutionally required, conservatism of the judicial function. The problem is
that the intermediate scrutiny test does not seem to invite this type of
balanced response.
Although various factors, including the doctrine of stare decisis, cause
a deep reluctance to suggest that the Court abandon the constitutional
protection now afforded to gender discrimination, perhaps some consideration should be given to permitting a more flexible response to such claims. 27
The purpose of this suggestion is not to open the possibilities for ever more
acts of gender discrimination. Rather the purpose is to place a layer of
humility over the judicial enforcement of a judicially created right. At the

25. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("But a
Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory").
26. Actually a decent argument can be made that but for the development of the
intermediate scrutiny test, the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) would have been ratified. A
number of commentators argued persuasively that the ERA was unnecessary in light of the
Court's gender jurisprudence. Certainly some of the support for ERA was undermined by
these arguments. If in fact the Court's creative impulses led to the demise of the ERA, two
observations are in'order. First, the Court's creative activism undermined an important part
of the constitutional and political process. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring). Second, and somewhat ironically, had the Court not done so
and had the ERA passed, VMI's all-male admissions policy would be even more constitutionally
suspect under a strict scrutiny standard.
27. The Court's recent decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992),
which reaffirmed the basic premises of Roe v. Wade and at the same time opened the doors
for a more flexible judicial response to state regulation, suggests that the Court may be open
to such a possibility.
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same time, the purpose is to recognize that issues of gender are simply
more complicated than any single formula can comprehend. Just as the
2 showed good judgment
Court in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II)
in its exercise of temporal patience, the present judiciary might consider the
wisdom of adopting a less narrowly focused and controlled inquiry with
respect to problems of gender discrimination. The Brown II Court recognized
that the social complexities facing it in devising a remedy for segregated
public schools were well beyond the competence of a precise, judicially
fabricated formula; the complexities of gender are no less deserving of such
judicial humility and open-mindedness. Justice Blackmun's dissenting observation in Hogan is apropos: "I have come to suspect that it is easy to
go too far with rigid rules in this area of claimed sex discrimination, and
to lose-indeed destroy-values that mean much to some people by forbidding the state to offer them a choice while not depriving others of an
alternative choice." 29
The court of appeals, of course, was not free to ignore the intermediate
scrutiny test. Accordingly, the court based its resolution of this controversy
on the view that the Commonwealth had failed to explain why it provided
a unique and valuable educational experience for men-namely, the VMI
experience-and not for women. This is the precise question intermediate
scrutiny appears to demand, but the precision of the question fails to
account for the complexity of the issue. By focusing exclusively on the
absence of an all-female VMI-style institution or program, the question
overlooks a much more significant and complicated question, the one that
really ought to be most pertinent: Overall, does the system of higher
education provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia discriminate on the
basis of gender? An analogy may be helpful. If a state university fields a
Division I all-male football team, a challenge to the legality of that practice
would not turn on whether the university sponsored an identical women's
team, but on whether the university provided women with equivalent opportunities to engage in interscholastic athletics. 0 Similarly, in the context
of the VMI case, the question is not whether the state provides an allfemale version of VMI, but whether the Commonwealth provides equivalent
opportunities in higher education for women. One possibility is to abandon
the means-ends analysis of intermediate scrutiny in lieu of an approach that
takes into account a more broadly inclusive array of factors.
In applying a more open-ended approach in the context of the VMI
litigation, a court examining the issue may wish to consider several factors.
First, if there are recognized differences between the genders, it is hard to
believe that VMI is not a deep reflection of some of those differences. One
would not be surprised to learn that there are no private VMI-style schools

28. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
29. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 734 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).

30. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988).
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for women; the nonexistence of a market for such schools ought to tell us
something about the reasonableness of VMI's admissions policy; it also
suggests something about the purely symbolic nature of this lawsuit. On
the other hand, it may well be that the idea of the male as an aggressor
and the female as a nurturer is simply a rank stereotype that ought to be
relegated to a museum of cultural anthropology; but, without belaboring
the obvious, it is a stereotype founded upon something more than an
irrational guess or an animosity toward either group. While an argument
can be made that such rigid patterns ought to be discouraged or altered, it
does not necessarily follow that the contrary and more traditional view and
practice is without constitutional sanction.
In addition, the calculus of discrimination might well include the fact
that in 1989 (the year prior to the filing of the suit), total enrollment in
Virginia's public institutions of higher education included 72,819 men and
85,441 women. Only 1312 of those men attended VMI. The 13,000 student
differential is by no means dispositive, but it seems relevant, at least if the
question involves the system-wide equality of opportunity for women.
Similarly relevant, is that fact that both Old Dominion University and
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University-both state universitiesoffer majors in women's studies programs. Again, these factors are not
dispositive, but are certainly part of the overall fabric to be considered in
assessing the constitutionality of female opportunity within the Commonwealth's vast system of higher education. Also relevant might be the
availability of single-sex education among private colleges. There are five
such colleges for women in Virginia and only one for men. In addition,
Virginia men and women attending these colleges are eligible for statesponsored Tuition Assistance Grants.
Next, given the active congressional response to matters of gender
discrimination and sexual exploitation, it is pertinent that Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits gender discrimination in
institutions of higher education, specifically exempts undergraduate institutions "that traditionally and continually from [their] establishment [have]
had a policy of admitting only students of one sex. .

."I'

VMI falls into

that category. Regardless of the scope of congressional power to define
constitutional rights, one would think that when the Court is operating in
its creative and super-legislative capacity the views of a coordinate branch
would be of significance. It is alsb worth noting that Congress in addressing
a perceived problem of gender discrimination in higher education developed
a flexible response that accounted for tradition, while the Court's response
sees tradition as the problem. One is tempted to suggest that perhaps the
best vehicle for the development of a law of gender discrimination is the
enforcement power of Congress under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Certainly, given the complexities of the issues from a social policy
perspective, Congress may be better suited to devise an appropriate response.

31. Id.
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One final point, even if intermediate scrutiny must remain the test,
some consideration should be given to permitting wide latitude in the
development of an appropriate remedy. The court of appeals specifically
declined to order the admission of women to VMI and remanded the case
to the district court with the following instructions:
[T]he Commonwealth might properly .ecide to admit women to
VMI and adjust the program to implement that choice, or it might
establish parallel institutions or parallel programs, or it might
abandon state support of VMI, leaving VMI the option to pursue
its own policies as a private institution. While it is not ours to
determine, there might be other more creative options or combi32
nations.
This short list of options with the invitation to further creativity may
also be a response to the imposed conformity of the intermediate scrutiny
test. If so, the parties and the district court ought to be free to consider a
wide range of options. Those options need not necessarily focus on providing
women a VMI-style experience; indeed, in the absence of some showing
that a significant number of women in the Commonwealth would seek such
an option, the Commonwealth's money might be more productively spent
and the interests of women more substantially advanced by adoption of a
state-wide program that will actually attract and benefit women. The remedy
could include a wide range of possibilities, or a combination of such
possibilities, such as special programs, scholarships, incentives, an all-female
college within a co-ed university, and grants earmarked for women who
wish to attend all-female private colleges within the Commonwealth. The
point is not that VMI ought to be preserved as an all-male bastion, but
that the Commonwealth ought to be given broad leeway in determining
how best to ensure that women are provided an equal opportunity within
the Commonwealth's system of higher education. Of course, one option,
and maybe the most sensible option, is to admit women to VMI. That
possibility, however, should not be imposed, but should remain an option
to be selected at the discretion of the Commonwealth.
CONCLUSION

The controversy surrounding VMI's all-male admissions policy is fraught
with conflict and imbued with symbolic significance: the supposed conflict
between the genders, the tension between tradition and emerging social

32. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 900 (4th Cir. 1992). One cannot help but
be reminded of the "all deliberate speed" remedy provided in Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301. In
that case, the Court recognized its own basic incompetence to design a precise remedy for the
constitutional violation it found in Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
The Court in Brown II recognized, at least implicitly, the important role of the political
branches in helping to discover and implement a solution that was both constitutionally
grounded and practical.
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values, the exercise of judicial review versus the functioning or malfunctioning of the democratic process, strict construction, judicial activism,
women's rights, men's rights, and the modern military. My point, a simple
one I think, is that the judiciary must beware of overextending the function
of judicial review, and it must be most wary of doing so when that potential
exercise involves an act of judicial creation. In the specific context of gender
discrimination, the federal courts would do well to adopt a more fluid
approach to examining questions of gender discrimination, recognizing that
the more precise the formula adopted, the more likely that formula is to
fail to fully examine the nature of the underlying claims and conflicting
interests. Moreover, considering the extraconstitutional roots of this judicially created right, the more flexible approach would be an appropriate
indication of judicial humility in the realm of constitutional law making.

